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Book Review
WEIGHING PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND
DISCRETION: FIXING THE IMBALANCE
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR. By Angela J. Davis.
Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. 264.
Reviewed by Harvey Gee*
I. INTRODUCTION
It might sound cliché, but some legal commentators contend that
prosecutors—the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system—
too often seek convictions instead of justice.1 Commentators argue that
prosecutors pay more attention to their cases involving educated and
upper-income victims, and put more work into them, than cases where
the victims are poor and uneducated.2 Not surprisingly, lenient plea
bargains are more available to wealthy defendants than to indigent
defendants.3 Angela J. Davis, a Professor of Law at American University
Washington College of Law, expands on this premise in her timely and
well-written book, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor
[Arbitrary Justice]. In Arbitrary Justice, Professor Davis examines the
growing power of prosecutors, from mandatory minimum sentencing
laws that enhance prosecutorial control over the outcome of cases to the
increasing politicization of prosecutors’ offices. Professor Davis knows
her subject well. She gained a tremendous amount of trial experience
and practical knowledge as a public defender and agency director at the
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia [PDS], one of the
leading indigent defense offices in the country.
Part II of this Book Review discusses the role of prosecutors in the
American criminal justice system. Next, Part III expands the issue of
criminal administration beyond the traditional black-and-white racial
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scheme. Part IV describes Professor Davis’s proposals for reform.
Finally, this Book Review concludes with a reminder that criminal justice
remains a complex topic for all Americans.
II. PROSECUTORS, POWER, AND JUSTICE
At the outset, Arbitrary Justice offers an illuminating look at the
prosecutor’s role in the criminal justice system. Professor Davis argues
that the most serious system-wide issue is the lack of accountability for
the daily decisions of prosecutors.4 According to Professor Davis,
prosecutors hold vast power because they are largely under-regulated.
She contends that the criminal justice system gives prosecutors a pass by
allowing them to circumvent scrutiny and accountability, which affords
them more power than any other government official.5 “Because
prosecutors make these decisions in private without meaningful
supervision or accountability, they are rarely punished when they
engage in misconduct.”6 In fact, Professor Davis asserts that prosecutors
are often rewarded with promotion and career advancement as long as
their conviction rates remain high.7 The author emphasizes that the time
has come to focus on prosecutors, require more information from them,
and institute fundamental reforms that result in more fairness in the
performance of the prosecutorial function.8
Professor Davis further argues that a prosecutor’s legal
responsibility is not just to represent the state in seeking convictions, but
is to pursue justice. In her work as a public defender, Professor Davis
noticed that prosecutors held and dealt almost all of the playing cards.
In her time with the Public Defender’s Office, Professor Davis found that
prosecutors were the most powerful officials in the criminal justice
system.9 Professor Davis states that the routine, everyday decisions of
prosecutors control the direction and outcome of criminal cases and
cause more serious consequences for criminal defendants.10
She
contends that the most remarkable feature of these important, sometimes
life-and-death decisions is that they are totally discretionary and
virtually unreviewable.11 Even more remarkable is that prosecutors
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make the most important of these discretionary decisions behind closed
doors and answer only to other prosecutors.12
There have been high-profile cases involving the abuse of
prosecutorial power. For example, after the release of Arbitrary Justice,
there was the prosecution of former Senator Ted Stevens on corruption
charges. After Senator Stevens was convicted, United States District
Judge Emmet G. Sullivan dismissed seven counts regarding Stevens’s
lying about the receipt of $250,000 in gifts and free renovations to his
Alaska house. Judge Sullivan then appointed an outside lawyer to
investigate allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, including the
mishandling of evidence and witnesses.13
Apparently, federal
prosecutors failed to provide the defense with notes that contradicted
key government witnesses.14 Judge Sullivan remarked that “[i]n 25 years
on the bench, I have never seen anything approaching the mishandling
and misconduct that I have seen in this case.”15
In her book, Professor Davis provides the example of the Duke
Lacrosse Team rape case.16 In that case, two African American strippers
were sent by an escort service to the home of one of the captains of the
Duke Lacrosse Team.17 One of the strippers claimed that several white
members of the Duke Lacrosse Team raped and assaulted her. Michael
Nifong was the Durham County District Attorney who led the
prosecution of the Duke Lacrosse players.18 According to Professor
Davis, racial and economic dynamics motivated Nifong’s decision to
charge the Duke Lacrosse players.19 Professor Davis explains that racial
animus was apparent because Nifong’s supporters were primarily
African Americans who rallied around the alleged victim.20 On the other
hand, the white defendants were represented by a high-priced defense
attorney.21 At the time of the prosecution, critics claimed Nifong was
pandering to his constituents because he was up for re-election.22
Nevertheless, the three Duke Lacrosse players battled the phony gangrape allegations for thirteen months before the North Carolina Attorney
Id.
See Del Quentin Wilber, Judge Orders Probe of Attorneys in Stevens Case, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 2009, at A1.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 196–98; see also Duff Wilson, Ethics Hearing For Duke
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A14.
17
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 196.
18
Id. at 196–97; Wilson, supra note 16, at A14.
19
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 197.
20
See id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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General declared them innocent and dropped the charges against them.23
Ultimately, Nifong was found guilty of misconduct in the criminal case
against the Duke Lacrosse players, stripped of his law license, and
ousted from office.24
In another example, Professor Davis claims that the prosecution in
the Jena Six cases was racially motivated.25 She argues that Louisiana
prosecutor Reed Walters engaged in race-based selective prosecution in
response to a series of confrontations between African American and
white students at predominately-white Jena High School.26 Professor
Davis emphatically claims that “[a]lthough a number of white and black
students engaged in assaultive behavior, Walters charged only one white
student with a minor misdemeanor while charging a group of black
students with serious adult felonies for engaging in a very similar
behavior.”27
Given the racial reality of the American criminal justice system,
Professor Davis advocates for racial disparity studies designed to reveal
racially discriminating treatment. Such studies should be published and
widely available to the public.28 As a result, prosecutors could
acknowledge the importance of racial disparity to the electorate.29 The
proposed studies would assist in determining whether defendants of
color receive harsher treatment for the same criminal behavior as whites
and whether some cases are prosecuted more vigorously than others
depending on the racial backgrounds of the defendant and the victim.30
Demonstrating its comprehensiveness, Arbitrary Justice also discusses
prosecutorial discretion in capital punishment cases. Professor Davis
cautions that the arbitrariness of the decision to charge the death penalty
is troubling. She asserts that “the death penalty decision is far too
arbitrary, often depending on the philosophy and proclivities of the chief
prosecutor instead of on legal principles, standards, or guidelines.”31
Professor Davis also notes that the decision to seek the death penalty is
often based on politics.32 According to Davis, the chief prosecutor is
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concerned about re-election; thus, his or her decisions are heavily
influenced by their potential political consequences.33
III. AMERICAN JUSTICE IS NOT ALL BLACK, WHITE, AND BROWN
Professor Davis notes that studies, such as Professor David Baldus’s,
illustrate that there are sentencing disparities between African
Americans, Hispanics, and whites.34 Throughout Arbitrary Justice,
Professor Davis holds the reader’s attention because she uses specific,
compelling stories of individuals from her prior cases to reveal the unfair
and unequal treatment of both defendants and victims.35 As a public
defender, Professor Davis saw disparities in the way prosecutors
handled individual cases. Cases involving educated, wealthy victims
took priority over cases involving poorer, uneducated victims.36 From
her perspective, the few white defendants represented by her office
sometimes appeared to receive preferential treatment from prosecutors.37
Although Professor Davis never saw evidence of intentional
discrimination based on race or class, the consideration of such factors in
the prosecutorial process often produced disparate results along class
and racial lines.38 But intentional discrimination is not always necessary
to create racial injustice, and prosecutors are not the only individuals
who contribute to shocking consequences. Here, a broader perspective is
possible.
For instance, Professor Viet Dinh asserts that race relations in the
context of criminal justice have never been a strictly black-and-white
conflict, although many legal scholars tend to frame it as such.39
Professor Dinh advocates for analyses of the criminal justice system to
reflect the multiracial reality of American life. The application of
Professor Dinh’s notion to Arbitrary Justice reveals that Professor Davis
tends to write about justice administration in Washington, D.C. as
existing in a black-and-white paradigm. Thus, the analysis in Arbitrary
Justice should be extended beyond the Beltway to show that criminal
justice may be evaluated in a multiracial context.
Furthermore, Asian Americans are often overlooked in
conversations about race and crime. In fact, Asian Americans represent
Id. at 91.
Id. at 82–84.
35
See generally id.
36
Id. at 37–39.
37
Id.
38
See generally Wilson, supra note 16, at A14.
39
See Viet Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1998) (book
review of Randall Kennedy’s Race, Crime, and the Law (1997)).
33
34
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one of the fastest growing segments of the prison population. The model
minority stereotype of Asian Americans as one monolithic ethnic group
that has achieved success though education and hard work without the
assistance of governmental benefits is one possible explanation for the
lack of attention given to Asian-American crime. The model minority
myth has created a stereotype of Asian Americans.40 Such a myth is
disingenuous, however, and masks the reality that Asian Americans are
still affected by discrimination and are involved in the criminal justice
system.41
Five years ago, the U.S. District Court in San Francisco considered a
prisoner’s claim of discrimination stemming from a thirty-six-year
absence of minorities serving as grand jury forepersons. Although the
court in Chin v. Runnels ultimately denied the claim, the court noted the
subjectivity involved in the judge’s selection of grand jury forepersons
and the possibility of bias.42 In Chin, the defendant filed a habeas
petition claiming that his right to equal protection was violated because
Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Hispanic Americans were
excluded from service as forepersons on the grand jury that indicted
him.43 The defendant relied on statistical evidence to demonstrate that
from 1960 to 1996, the grand jury forepersons selected in San Francisco
were underrepresented with respect to three minority groups: Chinese,
Filipino, and Hispanics. There were no forepersons chosen from these
groups between 1960 and 1966.44
Yet, as the defendant emphasized, during this time period the
composition of the grand jury pools from which grand jury forepersons
were chosen consisted of: 13.4 percent Chinese Americans; 6.9 percent
Hispanic Americans; and 4.0 percent Filipino American.45 The defendant
relied on expert opinion that reflected there was a 0.0003 percent chance
that no individuals from the three groups would be chosen to serve as
foreperson.46 “[D]uring the same period there were Chinese-American
and Filipino-American grand jurors who had comparable age, education
and occupational characteristics to the individuals selected [to be
See FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 42 (2002);
Gabriel J. Chin, et. al, Beyond Self-Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of
Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 129, 149 (1996); Sumi K.
Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets
Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 185 (1997).
41
See Jerry Kang, Racial Violence Against Asian Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1931
(1993).
42
343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
43
Id. at 892.
44
Id. at 895.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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foreperson].”47 The defendant further alleged that while the number of
African Americans and female forepersons increased, there was no
increase in forepersons of Chinese or Hispanic descent.48 He based his
prima facie case of discrimination on the fact that Chinese Americans
were a legally recognized class and his undisputed statistics showed that
“no Chinese-Americans had served as grand jury foreperson over a 36year period, even though they represented 13.4% of the pool of grand
jurors from which the foreperson was chosen.”49
Ultimately, United States District Judge Charles Breyer found that
the narrow scope of habeas review prevented the court from reviewing
the issues de novo. As a result, the court could not take “a closer
inquiry—particularly as to the possibility that the selection process could
have been subject to unconscious bias.”50 Judge Breyer concluded that
the constraints of habeas review prevented the court from finding the
state court’s evidentiary findings objectively unreasonable.51
In addition, in Chin’s state court appeal, the Superior Court’s
executive director and assistant district attorney testified that race did
not factor into the selection process. Instead, according to their
testimony, the presiding judges applied race-neutral criteria looking for
members with “‘leadership’ experience, ‘people skills,’ and the capacity
to motivate others to work together.”52
However, Judge Breyer observed that “unconscious stereotyping or
biases may have contributed to the exclusion of these groups
notwithstanding the best of intentions of those involved.”53 He
remarked that the qualities of leadership and people skills were
subjective judgments that involved “subtle and unconscious mental
processes susceptible to bias.”54 Moreover, a member of the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, who echoed Judge Breyer’s
opinion, noted “the cultural bias of selecting officials and all the
stereotypical misconceptions, the fears, myths and stereotypes about the
leadership skills of Asian[]Americans,” and suggested that more
research needed to be done on the issue of why Asian Americans are not
able to break into management levels and are not viewed as leaders.55
Id.
Id. at 895–96.
49
Id. at 901
50
Id. at 903.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 905.
53
Id. at 906.
54
Id.
55
Transcript of July 22, 2008 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Meeting,
Issues Facing Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (AAPIs) in the Federal Workplace and
47
48
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Judge Breyer cited to critical race theory scholarship that addressed
the pervasiveness of unconscious racial stereotyping and bias.56 The first
citation was to Professor Charles Lawrence’s pioneering article, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.57
Professor Lawrence asserts that unconscious racial motivation influences
the behavior that produces racial discrimination and that it is impractical
to require conscious or intentional motivation in a wrongdoer’s mind.58
Consequently, Lawrence concluded that because of the ubiquity of racist
beliefs and the fact that people are not even conscious that they hold
those beliefs, a motive-centered doctrine of racial discrimination creates
a heavy burden of persuasion.59 Lawrence further articulates a critique
of the Intent Doctrine, which he considered outdated and ineffective.60
These facts have long been overlooked by the courts; the harms of racial
bias and inequality exist whether or not decision-makers act with clear
racial animus.61
Essentially, under this theory of stereotyping, individuals who
believe all Asian Americans are highly skilled at mathematics, nonassertive, and quiet, will continue to hold this belief whenever they
encounter Asian Americans, even if it is not true. In Chin, Judge Breyer
also referred to the state court transcripts of a superior court
administrator who testified that, based on his twenty years of experience,
judges selected the foreperson after an off-record in-chambers discussion
with him or with the deputy assistant attorney who served as an
advisor.62 The administrator stated that a foreperson must get along
with others when conducting a meeting and must be able to manage a
jury.63 Likewise, the deputy district attorney, who was a grand jury
advisor, testified that judges seek forepersons who were good leaders,
strong motivators, and possessed effective administrative skills.64 While
Judge Breyer analyzed the unconscious bias that has played a role in
contemporary discrimination against Asian Americans, this unconscious

Compliance Manual Chapter on Religious Discrimination at 14, http://www.eeoc.gov/
abouteeoc/meetings/7-22-08/transcript.html.
56
Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
57
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
58
Id. at 321.
59
Id. at 319.
60
Id.
61
See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005).
62
Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
63
Id.at 896.
64
Id.
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bias is ultimately difficult to prove, and under traditional equal
protection laws, it has been allowed to exist unchallenged.
Significantly, Judge Breyer closes his opinion with a four-paragraph
exploration of the model minority myth and negative stereotyping of
Asian Americans. Perhaps Judge Breyer was very cognizant of the
model minority myth because he worked in San Francisco, a city with a
large Asian community, with Judge Edward Chen, who is the first and
only Asian American on the federal bench for the Northern District of
California.65 Whatever his influences may have been, Judge Breyer’s
discussion sets forth three related points about Asian American
stereotypes that can be affected by unconscious bias: (1) Asian
Americans have been described as “nonassertive and deferential,
intelligent but devious, and mathematically and technically oriented
rather than verbally skilled[]”; (2) Asian Americans are not perceived to
be compatible in managerial and executive roles or as lawyers because
they lack leadership skills; and (3) Asian Americans “are often perceived
as quiet and unassuming.”66
In comparison, based on the reviewer’s personal experiences as a
public defender, during jury selection, aside from the jury questionnaires
and questions posed to potential jurors, very little is known about jurors.
It is quite plausible that attorney and judge may fall into a comfortable
tendency to base their judgments on racial or cultural stereotypes, unless
challenged. Judges must select a jury foreperson in a matter of minutes.
As discussed in Chin, perhaps San Francisco judges gave undue
deference to certain racial stereotypes. San Francisco is such a diverse,
multicultural city; it is surprising that there has never been an Asian
American jury foreperson. Rather, the exclusion of Chinese Americans
from serving as grand jury forepersons is likely evidence of an
unconscious racial intent. The absence of an Asian American foreperson
in San Francisco should be as glaring as if there was never an African
American foreperson in Washington, D.C. or if a Hispanic had never
been appointed as foreperson in San Antonio. But, unfortunately, as
discussed by Judge Breyer in Chin, discrimination against Asian
Americans often goes unnoticed.
IV. MODERATE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Unlike other commentators, Professor Davis not only focuses on the
problems, but she also offers a sensible agenda for comprehensive
See Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1109,
1109 (2003).
66
Chin, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 907–08.
65
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review and reform. Arbitrary Justice challenges the legal community and
concerned citizens to pursue and enact meaningful standards of conduct
and effective methods of accountability to help prosecutors serve their
communities and the interests of justice. Professor Davis’s suggestions
include: (1) having national, state, and local bar associations conduct indepth investigations to determine the adequacy of current prosecutorial
misconduct controls and possible reforms; (2) improving the plea
bargaining process by requiring prosecutors to prove all of the relevant
information, which would enable the defendant to make an informed
decision, require prosecutors to reveal the weaknesses in their case, and
inform the defendant of information that is helpful to the defense; and
(3) creating accountability through transparency to improve the
prosecutor’s troubling role in the implementation of the death penalty.67
While Professor Davis’s reforms are modest, it is still unlikely that
any substantial cultural reform in the federal, state, and local
prosecutorial systems will occur quickly. As the Author has personally
witnessed as a public defender, and from what Arbitrary Justice shows,
the American criminal justice system is highly complex.
The last two years have produced a rise in the rate of violent crime in
large American cities. Simultaneously, the national rate of incarceration
is continuing to rise at an unprecedented rate. This dramatic observation
is produced by such factors as: changing crime rates, strict sentencing,
politics, culture, and demographics. There is no consensus on these new
realities; however, sentencing laws and increased incarceration are often
referred to as the solution to address increasing crime rates. A reliance
on this approach imposes a heavy burden on courts and communities,
but only marginally impacts crime. The racial divide in crime and
punishment in America is also exacerbated by unequal treatment in
sentencing. But there is room for optimism. President Barack Obama
recognizes our criminal justice system needs reform. If President Obama
follows through with his campaign promises, he will work to: (1)
eliminate sentencing disparities; (2) sign legislation banning racial
profiling by federal law enforcement agencies; and (3) reduce crime and
recidivism by providing ex-offender support. Such priorities represent
an effort to restore and advance our nation’s commitment to equal
justice.68

See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 180.
barackobama.com, Organizing for America, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/
civil_rights/index_campaign.php#racial-profiling (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).

67
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V. CONCLUSION
In sum, Arbitrary Justice offers strong support for the proposition that
criminal justice cannot be equally divided between good guys and bad
guys or between justice and injustice. Rather, criminal justice and racial
justice are complex subjects each deserving of deeper consideration. A
closer and more meaningful examination of the continually evolving
criminal justice system would uncover the real reasons for crime, which
would assist policymakers in developing pragmatic measures to address
the present day realities of crime and punishment.
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